We cannot know the past. Not
unambiguously, and not without substantial interpretation. That is a
scary premise and a shaky beginning for someone who purports to
investigate and interpret the archaeology of history and culture in
early Virginia, a place and time whose histories have been studied as
intensively as any on earth. Nonetheless, my certain belief in the uncertainty
of knowledge is a principal reason for my writing. I might have
chosen instead to write a novel, a book of unquestioned fiction based
on my interpretations of life in the port of Rocketts, or at Jordan's
Journey, or at Curles Plantation, but I did not. It could have been a
detective story: the archaeologist as private eye, sifting through
the clues of the past, squeezing the meager material evidence until a
string of brilliant deductions leads, finally, to... to what? To
truth?
Anyone who has ever had a heated
quarrel with a lover should seriously doubt our ability to find out
the truth of the past. You argue. Names are called and threats are
made. What started the fight? Did X roll the toothpaste wrong or
did Y forget to lower the toilet seat?
"You said..., then I said..."
"Oh no you didn't. First I
said...., then you said..."
Two hours after the argument you're
still arguing, or, perhaps, trying not to argue, about who said or
did what, in what order. What was the actual course of events? What
came first? What was the fight about? Two people who lived through
that historic transaction only a short while ago cannot agree. The
tone of his voice, the look on her face... What did they mean? These
subtle spins on the events themselves may have meant something
different to each of the combatants, even as the events unfolded.
And, later, when the intent is to kiss and make up, rather than to
make the opponent squirm, he himself remembers a different meaning to
that tone of his voice, and she is quite certain she had a very
different look on her face. Two people, one humble event in real
life, and even these participants cannot help but reinterpret the
past through the needs and perceptions of the present.
How silly it is, then, to think we can
unearth sherds of broken dishes, lumps of rusty metal, stains in the
ground, and reconstruct with certainty what really happened in the
distant past, among people whose lives we never touched. How
perverse to suppose that tax records, census documents, deeds, wills,
and an occasional letter or diary, tell us what really happened in
history. And how arrogant we are to believe that, even if these
fragments of texts and materials carry the truth, we can actually
read this truth faithfully. And if we had other texts, other
artifacts, would these tell more of the same truth, or different
truths? And if truth is multiple, if interpretations of events are
plural, then what makes us think we can truly know any past, let
alone all versions of that past?
If I had chosen to write a novel about
an archaeological site--and I still might someday--and readers
decided they liked my story-telling, then the rich documentation and
archaeological record we historical archaeologists often deal with
would allow me to write a novel a year, for the rest of my life, and
not begin to exhaust in my lifetime the stories, the characters, and
the events that unfolded on even a single city lot, or a single
colonial plantation. Potentially, there are chapters in each of the
thousands of artifacts recovered from one small excavation. Certainly
a good writer would have no trouble writing a book around each
character in the 40-odd households and firms that lived on or owned
Lot 203 in the town of Rocketts, or the 60-some persons who settled
at Jordan's Journey in the 1620s, or the 11 or 12 generations of
households which called Curles Plantation home. So which story would
I write?
As a scientist, I suppose I shouldn't
have such a dilemma. After all, I should simply gather the facts and
tell the story. I would test hypotheses and reveal the
answers. And I wouldn't get bogged down in the particulars. A few
years ago an archaeologist was damned if he or she could be labelled "historicist" or "particularist" or, a particularly horrific "historical-particularist." Science, or a peculiar view of it held
by many in the archaeological profession, had no place for
particulars. The study of the past was after bigger fish to fry than
what John or Jane Doe did at some particular place at some particular
time. That's fine as long as you remain in an ivory tower, and you
can depict individuals as anonymous John or Jane Does. Many
archaeologists can do that, as can many historians and many
anthropologists. I cannot.
If you are a "generalist" in search
of answers, in search of truth, and you are a social historian,
perhaps you will comb, say, census records or city directories, and
you will count things. How many times is someone called a carpenter? How many people were between the ages of 50 and 60?
These numbers are data. You can manipulate these data. Add them,
divide them, calculate their means, medians, modes, and interquartile
ranges. You can plot them, scattergram them, and histogram them.
Factor, cluster, and scale them. Roll out hypotheses about them, and
test your hypotheses with calculable ranges of error and certainty.
You can know something about the truth of the past within definable
confidence intervals. And when you're finished with your research you
know...what? There were 15 carpenters between the ages of 50 and 60
in place X at time Y. Or were there? Were some of these shipwrights
and others cabinet makers? Was every carpenter listed as such? Did
every record concerning every carpenter survive? Were some of these
master craftsmen and others part-time nail-pounders? Were some shop
owners and others slaves? What are you certain of? You know
something not very specific about the past in general with some
measure of statistical certainty, about which you cannot often judge
the reliability or validity. This is a form of knowledge, to be sure,
and often a useful one. But it is not the only one, and, I contend,
not the most interesting.
There are other approaches. You could
take a path that would be recognizable to the genealogist. Instead of
searching through documents and counting carpenters, you discover
someone. Not a John or Jane Doe, but a John Craddock or a Jane
Randolph. One document tells you some skimpy tidbits about John or
Jane, so you look through more documents, and more and more: city
hall records, court records, military records, Freedman Bureau
papers, newspaper advertisements. You take shovel and trowel and hoe
and uncover the foundations of Jane's kitchen or John's privy. This
approach leaves you with the scattered fragments of real people's
lives. If you take time to chase down more fragments about relatives,
neighbors, and business associates, soon you have fragments of a
whole community. These pieces provide a mosaic, a puzzle, a
kaleidoscope of slippery, changing, hard-to-nail-down, but
nonetheless real reality. But there is no determined confidence
interval. There is truth, but no measure of its truthfulness. There
are stories, but they rely as much on the story teller as on the
texts and the artifacts. Different readers will tell different
stories about these same fragments. It is not a matter of one story
being the right one. There are many stories to tell.
In neither type of knowledge is there
any real certainty. The generalist will argue that his or her
deductions and inferences can be tested or confirmed, but
they are no more robust for all that. What differs in these
approaches is the authority with which the researcher presents
conclusions. In the first, the scientistic approach, conclusions are
reached and presented with the authority of a pure method. In the
latter approach, sketches and impressions are related, but no claim
to perfect verity is made. The reader of the scientistic version of
truth is confronted with claims of truth. The reader of the
interpretivist text is provided an opportunity to sense the truth,
and to help create it. Certainly the research speaks with some
intention of authority, just as the artist is aware, dimly or
acutely, of her intentions in creating a painting or a poem or a
novel. But she is not the final arbiter of her work's meaning, for
each of us encounters it on our own, and in our own contexts.
The archaeological, anthropological,
culture-historical study of a community or place in the past requires
some measure of each approach. As an archaeologist I claim a certain
amount of expertise in unraveling the sequence of events on an
archaeological site through the use of logical methods of excavation
and interpretation of stratigraphy. I claim, too, a certain authority
to speak about the artifacts of Prehistoric, Colonial and 19th-century America,
particularly in the contexts of Virginia's history, a subject I have
long studied. As an anthropologist, I further defend some claims
about my general knowledge of human social life and culture. But I
was as much a stranger to the people of Rocketts, and Curles, and
Magnolia Grange and Jordan's Journey as anyone living today when
first I began to delve into garbage piles and microfilm reels. My
expertise, my authority to speak about the people who formed the
sites I have studied comes mostly from the fact that I have spent
much of my career thinking about them. None of this, however,
privileges my readings of the textual and material fragments as
ultimately more truthful than yours. I am telling stories. You may
accept my stories--or your interpretations of my stories--only to the
extent that I can convince you I have "been there," in the sense argued by anthropologist Clifford Geertz.
By "stories" I do not mean fictions.
None of what you will read here is intentionally untrue (though some
of it may be wrong). Geertz has written a wonderful and
disturbing series of analyses of anthropology's guiding lights, the
great ethnographers who did so much to define the field. In
re-analyzing some of the classical writings of ethnography, Geertz
has shown how the author's ability to convince the reader of his/her
authority to speak is of far greater importance than the presentation
of objective "data" when it comes to the canonization of
ethnographic works. Even in those cases in which separate students
studying the same human beings arrive at highly different
interpretations of their culture or society, there is a tendency to
continue to regard certain works as canonical based, perhaps
fundamentally, on the stylistic characteristics of their
presentations. Geertz completes his study with a wondering
about the future of social science and human studies. He simply
broaches the question of objective fact and meaning, but backs off,
only slightly disturbed. Others like me, fools perhaps, rush into the
void left in the wake of realization that human studies are searches
for meaning as much as, perhaps more than, they are searches for
information. Many are repelled by the notion that truth and rhetoric
are bedfellows, but the thought, once savored, is liberating.
Historical archaeologists are
confronted with the task of interpreting the lives and events of a
parcel of ground occupied over many lifetimes. Our readings of a
site and its history must "make sense." It must be internally
consistent with the observations made in the field, and in the
archives. That still leaves a great deal of leeway. Some might
choose to view the hermeneutics of archaeology (or history, cultural
criticism, or ethnography) as similar to the problem of a judge
confronted by a myriad of witnesses, all of whom appear to have
observed slightly different versions of the same "reality." The
judge may seek to uncover one objective reality and assume that the
various interpretations she hears are but approximations, like darts
stochastically distributed around a bullseye. By hearing enough
versions, the judge may feel capable of deciding what the real
reality is. I have little confidence in such a method. Instead of
seeking central tendencies, we can also keep our peripheral vision
aware of the margins and outliers that real life always includes.
If there is a single, real,
authoritative story to tell about any archaeological site I have
excavated, I doubt that spending the remainder of my life studying in
greater detail the field records, artifacts, and archival documents
would be adequate to reveal it. Rather, I view the project of
historical and anthropological interpretation as something more
similar to a group therapy session, a political caucus, or that
lovers' argument. There are various points of view, and all clamor to
be understood, accounted for, and reconciled. The truth is not
singular, it is multiple. Reality is always interpreted. It is not
the finding of truth we are concerned with, it is perpetuating and
enlivening a conversation about meaning and the nature of social
life.